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“The views expressed in this document are those of 
the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
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“The Cyber Security Risk”, 
Communications of the ACM, June 2012, 55(6)
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I have spent 25 years trying to secure computers...
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An Introduction to 
Computer Security 
[Part 1] 
Simson L. Garfinkel 
"Spies," "vandals," and "crackers" are out there, 
waiting to get into-or destroy-your databases. 
L AWYERS MUST UNDERSTAND is-sues of computer security, both 
for the protection of their own inter-
ests and the interests of their clients. 
39 
Lawyers today must automatically 
recognize insecure computer systems 
and lax operating procedures in the 
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The lack of security is inherent in modern information systems.
• Attack is easier and cheaper than defense.
• Cyber “Defense in depth” does not work
— a single vulnerability compromises.
It’s easier to break things than to fix them.
Today’s systems are less secure than those of the 1970s.
5










Cyber can directly target  
inner defenses
Thursday, May 16, 13
6
Thursday, May 16, 13
Today we expect computers to crash
We should also expect them to be hacked.
The solution is not better security
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[ISN] — infosecnews.org
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May 2013 — 
$45 million stolen from US banks with phony ATM cards
10
How hackers allegedly stole “unlimited”
amounts of cash from banks in just hours
Feds  accuse  eight  men  of  participating  in  heists  that  netted  $45  million.
Wikipedia
Federal  authorities  have  accused  eight  men  of  participating  in  21st-­Century  Bank  heists  that  netted  a
whopping  $45  million  by  hacking  into  payment  systems  and  eliminating  withdrawal  limits  placed  on
prepaid  debit  cards.
The  eight  men  formed  the  New  York-­based  cell  of  an  international  crime  ring  that  organized  and
executed  the  hacks  and  then  used  fraudulent  payment  cards  in  dozens  of  countries  to  withdraw  the
loot  from  automated  teller  machines,  federal  prosecutors  alleged  in  court  papers  unsealed  Thursday.
In  a  matter  of  hours  on  two  separate  occasions,  the  eight  defendants  and  their  confederates
withdrew  about  $2.8  million  from  New  York  City  ATMs  alone.  At  the  same  times,  "cashing  crews"  in
cities  in  at  least  26  countries  withdrew  more  than  $40  million  in  a  similar  fashion.
Prosecutors  have  labeled  this  type  of  heist  an  "unlimited  operation"  because  it  systematically
removes  the  withdrawal  limits  normally  placed  on  debit  card  accounts.  These  restrictions  work  as  a
safety  mechanism  that  caps  the  amount  of  loss  that  banks  normally  face  when  something  goes
wrong.  The  operation  removed  the  limits  by  hacking  into  two  companies  that  process  online
payments  for  prepaid  MasterCard  debit  card  accounts  issued  by  two  banks—the  National  Bank  of
Ras  Al-­Khaimah  PSC  in  the  United  Arab  Emirates  and  the  Bank  of  Muscat  in  Oman—according  to  an
indictment  filed  in  federal  court  in  the  Eastern  District  of  New  York.  Prosecutors  didn't  identify  the
payment  processors  except  to  say  one  was  in  India  and  the  other  in  the  United  States.
The  first  heist,  which  occurred  on  December  22  and  targeted  debit  cards  issued  by  the  UAE  bank,
dispatched  carders  in  about  20  countries  that  rapidly  withdrew  funds  in  more  than  4,500  ATM
transactions.  In  New  York  City  alone,  prosecutors  said,  the  defendants  and  their  co-­conspirators
withdrew  almost  $400,000  in  some  750  fraudulent  transactions  from  more  than  140  different  ATM
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April 2013 —
AP Twitter feed reports White House bombing
11
Hacked AP Twitter feed reporting fake
White House attack rocks markets
Account  compromise  comes  after  AP  targeted  by  malware  and  phishing  e-­mails.
The  seven-­minute  drop  in  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average  touched  off  by  a  single  tweet  falsely  claiming  the  White
House  had  been  bombed.  It  temporarily  wiped  out  about  1  percent  of  the  average,  which  can  translate  into  millions  or
billions  of  dollars  in  market  capitalization.
Stock  prices  plunged  and  then  quickly  recovered  after  a  Twitter  account  belonging  to  the  Associated
Press  was  hacked  and  used  to  send  a  bogus  report  falsely  claiming  that  the  White  House  had  been
bombed  and  President  Obama  was  injured.
"The  @AP  Twitter  account  has  been  suspended  after  it  was  hacked,"  an  unaffected  Twitter  account
belonging  to  the  news  organization  confirmed.  "The  tweet  about  an  attack  on  the  White  House  was
false."
In  a  testament  to  the  power  that  social  media  has  on  real-­world  finances,  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial
Average  fell  150  points,  or  about  1  percent,  immediately  following  the  tweet,  with  other  indexes
reacting  similarly.  The  Dow  quickly  regained  the  lost  ground  about  seven  minutes  after  the  sell-­off
began,  when  the  AP  confirmed  that  the  report  was  false.
The  bogus  tweet  was  sent  from  one  of  at  least  of  two  compromised  Twitter  accounts  belonging  to  the
Associated  Press.  Mike  Baker,  a  reporter  with  the  167-­year-­old  news  organization,  said  the  AP's
mobile  Twitter  account  was  compromised  as  well.  "The  @AP  hack  came  less  than  an  hour  after
some  of  us  received  an  impressively  disguised  phishing  email,"  he  wrote  in  a  separate  Twitter
dispatch.  In  recent  days  security  personnel  with  the  news  cooperative  discovered  malware  had
infected  some  of  its  computers,  officials  told  the  New  York  Times.
An  AP  spokesman  said  officials  are  working  with  Twitter  to  investigate  how  the  accounts  were
hacked.  Both  accounts  were  suspended  at  the  time  of  this  writing.
People  claiming  ties  with  a  group  known  as  the  Syrian  Electronic  Army  took  credit  for  the  compromise
and  provided  this  screenshot,  purporting  to  show  user  control  over  the  @AP  account,  as  proof.  The
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“Stolen laptop could contain important patient information”
14 May 2013
How many “stolen laptop” cases have there been?
12
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Possibly the only good news: 
cyber-weapons may not be terribly effective, either.
“The 2009 version of Stuxnet was neither very effective nor well-
timed and, in hindsight, may have been of net benefit to Tehran.”
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The cyber security mess: technical and social.
Most attention is focused on technical issues:
• Malware and anti-viruses
—Default allow vs. default deny
• Access Controls, Authentication, Encryption & Quantum Computing
• Supply chain issues
• Cyberspace as a globally connected “domain”
Non-technical issues are at the heart of the cyber security mess.
• Education & career paths
• Immigration
• Manufacturing policy
We will do better when we want to do better.
14
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What do we know 
think about cyber 
security today?
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Cyber Security is expensive.
Global cyber security spending: $60 billion in 2011
• Cyber Security M&A, pwc, 2011
172 Fortune 500 companies surveyed:
• Spending $5.3 billion per year on cyber security.
• Stopping 69% of attacks.
If they raise spending...
• $10.2 billion stops 84%
• $46.67 billion stops 95%
• “highest attainable level”
95% is not good enough.
16
Cyber Security M&A
Decoding deals in the global 
Cyber Security industry
pwc.com
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Cyber Security... is undefined.




• Using “network security” to secure desktops & servers?
• Something having to do with cybernetics
There is no way to measure cyber security
• Which OS is more secure?
• Which computer is more secure?
• Is “open source” more secure?
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We do know one thing about cyber security...
Does spending more money make a computer more secure?
18
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The more we learn about securing computers, 
the better we get at attacking them
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Cyber Security is an “insider problem.”
bad actors
good people with bad instructions
remote access
malware
If we can stop insiders, we might be able to secure cyberspace….
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Cyber Security is a “network security” problem.
We can’t secure the hosts, so secure the network!
• Isolated networks for critical functions.
• Stand-alone hosts for most important functions.
But strong crypto limits visibility into network traffic, and...
21
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... stuxnet shows that there are no isolated hosts.
22
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—Robert Morris (1932-2001), to the National Research Council’s Computer 
Science and Technology Board, Sept. 19, 1988
23
“to a first approximation, every computer in the world is 
connected to every other computer.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/technology/30morris.html
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“Computer Insecurity”, Peter G. Neumann
Issues In Science & Technology, Fall 1994
“Action is needed on many fronts to protect computer systems and 




The wonders of the Internet and the promise of the worldwide information infrastruc-
ture have recently reached headline status. Connectedness has become the Holy Grail
of the 1990s. But expansion of the electronic network brings with it increased potential
for harm as well as good. With a broader cross section of people logging on to the elec-
tronic superhighway and with the enhanced interconnectedness of all computer sys-
tems, the likelihood of mischievous or even criminal behavior grows, as does the poten-
tial extent of the damage that can be done.
But in spite of the higher risks and higher stakes, little attention has been paid to
the need for enhanced security. The stories that appear in the press from time to time
about prankster hackers breaking into a computer network or computer viruses
infecting government systems focus more on the skill of the culprit than the harm
done. The popular assumption is that break-ins are relatively harmless. Most
computer users complacently believe that if there was real cause for alarm,
government or corporate computer experts would recognize the problem and take
appropriate action.
Unfortunately, experts and neophytes alike have their heads in the sand on this
issue. In spite of repeated examples of the vulnerability of almost all computer
systems to invasion and manipulation, very few people recognize the magnitude of
the damage that can be done and even fewer have taken adequate steps to fix the
problem.
Action is needed on many





Peter G.Neumann is a principal scientist in the Computer Science Laboratory at SRI
International in Menlo Park, California. His new book, Computer-Related Risks (ACM
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It is easy to hide & exfiltrate information...
October 16, 2005
Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track You
Tiny Dots Show Where and When You Made Your Print
San Francisco - A research team led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) recently broke the code behind tiny tracking dots that 
some color laser printers secretly hide in every document.
http://seeingyellow.com/
25
Sample closeup of 
printer dots on a 
normal printed page
Sample closeup of the 
same dots showing only 
the blue channels to 
make the dots more 
visible.
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Cyber Security is a process problem.
Security encompasses all aspects
of an organization’s IT and HR
operations.
Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
—Few organizations can afford SDL.
—Windows 7 Windows 8 is still hackable...
26
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bruce_Schneier_1.jpg
“Security is a process, 
not a product”
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Windows RT hack
Microsoft controlled the 
hardware and the software.
Windows RT — still hacked
27
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Cyber Security is a money problem.
Security is a cost.....Not an “enabler”
• No ROI
Chief Security Officers are in a no-win situation:
• Security = passwords = frustration
• No reward for spending money to secure the infrastructure
• Money spent on security is “wasted” if there is no attack
“If you have responsibility for security but have no authority to set 
rules or punish violators, your own role in the organization is to take 
the blame when something big goes wrong.”
—Spaf’s first principle of security administration
Practical Unix Security, 1991
28
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Cyber Security is a “wicked problem”
No clear definition of the wicked problem
—You don’t understand the problem until you have a solution.
No “stopping rule”
—The problem can never be solved.
Solutions not right or wrong
—Benefits to one player hurt another — Information security vs. Free speech
Solutions are “one-shot” — no learning by trial and error
—No two systems are the same. The game keeps changing.
Every wicked problem is a symptom of another problem
• Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 1973
• Dave Clement, “Cyber Security as a Wicked Problem,” Chatham House, October 2011
• http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/178579
29
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Cyber Security has an active, malicious adversary.
The adversary...
—Turns your bugs into exploits
—Adapts to your defenses
—Waits until you make a mistake 
—Attacks your employees when your systems are secure
31
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For example...
Compiler bugs are security vulnerabilities!
The adversary chooses:
• What to exploit
• When to exploit it
• How to exploit it
We have seen:
• Optimizations can become 
security vulnerabilities
• The same errors are 
repeatedly made by different 
programmers
What’s difference between 
a bug and an attack?
—The programmer’s intent.
32
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It’s worse than that...
CPU bugs are remotely exploitable!
This means:
• Programs that are “secure” on one CPU may be vulnerable on another.
• Auditing the code & the compiler isn’t enough.
Kaspersky:
• “Fact: malware that uses CPU bugs really does exist;”
• “not apocalypse, just a new threat;”
•
33
Remote Code Execution 
through Intel CPU Bugs
Kris Kaspersky, Alice Chang
Endeavor Security, Inc.
CPU bugs are like a bullet from behind
www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/cs258/2010/D2T1 - Kris Kaspersky - Remote Code Execution Through Intel CPU Bugs.pdf
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ACComplice: Location Inference using
Accelerometers on Smartphones
Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Le T. Nguyen, Adrian Perrig, Joy Zhang
{junhan, eowusu, lenguyen, perrig, sky}@cmu.edu
Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract—The security and privacy risks posed by smartphone
sensors such as microphones and cameras have been well docu-
mented. However, the importance of accelerometers have been
largely ignored. We show that accelerometer readings can be
used to infer the trajectory and starting point of an individual
who is driving. This raises concerns for two main reasons.
First, unauthorized access to an individual’s location is a serious
invasion of privacy and security. Second, current smartphone
operating systems allow any application to observe accelerometer
readings without requiring special privileges. We demonstrate that
accelerometers can be used to locate a device owner to within a
200 meter radius of the true location. Our results are comparable
to the typical accuracy for handheld global positioning systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Location privacy has been a hot topic in recent news after it
was reported that Apple, Google, and Microsoft collect records
of the location of customers using their mobile operating sys-
tems [12]. In some cases, consumers are seeking compensation
in civil suits against the companies [8]. Xu and Teo find
that, in general, mobile phone users express lower levels of
concern about privacy if they control access to their personal
information. Additionally, users expect their smartphones to
provide such a level of control [20].
There are situations in which people may want to broadcast
their location. In fact, many social networking applications in-
corporate location-sharing services, such as geo-tagging photos
and status updates, or checking in to a location with friends.
However, in these instances, users can control when their
location is shared and with whom. Furthermore, users express
a need for an even richer set of location-privacy settings than
those offered by current location-sharing applications [2]. User
concerns over location-privacy are warranted. Websites like
“Please Rob Me” underscore the potential dangers of exposing
one’s location to malicious parties [5]. The study presented here
demonstrates a clear violation of user control over sensitive
private information.
This research was supported by CyLab at Carnegie Mellon under grants
DAAD19-02-1-0389 and W911NF-09-1-0273, from the Army Research Office,
and by support from NSF under TRUST STC CCF-0424422, IGERT DGE-
0903659, and CNS-1050224, and by a Google research award. The views
and conclusions contained here are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements,
either express or implied, of ARO, CMU, Google, NSF or the U.S. Government
or any of its agencies.
Accelerometers are a particularly interesting case because of
their pervasiveness in a large assortment of personal electronic
devices including tablet PCs, MP3 players, and handheld gam-
ing devices. This array of devices provides a large network for
spyware to exploit.
Furthermore, by correlating the accelerometer readings be-
tween multiple phones it is possible for an adversary to de-
termine whether the phones are in close proximity. Because
phones undergoing similar motions can be identified by their
accelerations, events such as earthquakes or even everyday
activities like public transportation (e.g., bus, train, subway)
produce identifiable motion signatures that can be correlated
with other users. As a consequence, if one person grants GPS
access, or exposes their cellular or Wi-Fi base station, then they
essentially expose the location of all nearby phones, assuming
the adversary has access to these devices.
a) Contributions: Our key insight is that accelerometers
enable the identification of one’s location despite a highly
noisy trajectory output. This is because the idiosyncrasies of
roadways create globally unique constraints. Dead reckoning
can be used to track a user’s location long after location services
have been disabled [6]. But as we show, the accelerometer can
be used to infer a location with no initial location information.
This is a very powerful side-channel that can be exploited even
if location-based services on the device are disabled.
b) Threat Model: We assume that the adversary can
execute applications on the mobile device, without any special
privileges except the capability to send information over the
network. The application will use some legitimate reason to
obtain access to network communication. This is easily accom-
plished by mimicking a popular application that many users
download; e.g., a video game. In the case of a game, network
access would be needed to upload high scores or to download
advertisements. We assume that the OS is not compromised,
so that the malicious application simply executes as a standard
application. The application can communicate with an external
server to leak acceleration information. Based on the leaked
information, the adversary can extract a mobile user’s trajectory
from the compromised device via data analysis.
Our goal is to determine the location of an individual driving
in a vehicle based solely on motion sensor measurements. The
general approach that we take is to first derive an approximate
motion trajectory given acceleration measurements–which we
discuss in §II. We then correlate that trajectory with map978-1-4673-0298-2/12/$31.00 c© 2012 IEEE
The attacker is smarter than you are…














(b) Mountain View, CA
Fig. 7. Verification of map matching algorithm with the known starting point. (a) and (b) show Experiment 2a (Pittsburgh, PA) and Experiment 2b (Mountain
View, CA), respectively. The green (star) curve indicates the motion trajectory obtained from ProbIN. The red (circle) curve indicates the mapped points. The
blue (x-mark) curve indicates the ground truth (i.e., actual route traveled) obtained from GPS data.
to the mapped point on C3, which is depicted in Figure 6(b).
This realignment mitigates the effect of the noise inherent in
the motion trajectory.
To verify the results, we perform the aforementioned map
matching algorithm on a map with a known starting point. We
pre-processed motion paths to remove highly transient noise in
the motion trajectory, which smooths the data while preserving
key features of the trajectory. Figure 7 illustrates the map
matching process of a motion trajectory.
Figures 7(a) and (b) show matching procedures for Experi-
ment 2a and Experiment 2b, respectively. The green (star) curve
shows the motion trajectory obtained from ProbIN. The red
(circle) curve illustrates the corresponding mapped points on
a map. The blue (x-mark) curve shows the ground truth using
GPS data to validate our algorithm.
B. Starting Point Prediction
This section explains an algorithm that can be used to predict
a starting point of a trajectory by applying the map matching
algorithm to all points on a given map. First the trajectory
is aligned to every point on the map (each node represents
a possible starting point). In order to determine the most likely
starting point, we compare each mapped route using a trajectory
difference metric (explained below).
We take the first point of the trajectory, P0, and plot all
candidate starting pionts. Let Mi be a point on a road network
that has been matched to Pi, a point on the motion trajectory.
We define Dist(Mi,Pi) as the distance between Mi and Pi.
Summing up Dist(Mi,Pi) from 1 to s, where s is the number







Figure 8 shows Dist(Mi,Pi) for all corresponding points
between the motion trajectory and the mapped points. The
difference score DS in Figure 8(a) is the sum of lengths of
Dist(Mi,Pi) for all i. Once DS is computed for each starting
point on the map, the starting points are ranked in ascending
order because a small DS is a good indicator that the actual
and predicted paths are similar.
In the case of erroneous starting points, the map matching
algorithm can encounter a dead end or may not be able to match
any road on the map to the motion trajectory, in which case the
map matching algorithm simply maps several motion trajectory
points to a single map location. Many starting points will not
result in any valid candidate paths, especially for longer paths
– we detect these cases and reject those paths.
We then take the top ten ranked points sorted in ascending
order of DS to locate the actual starting point. Among the highly
ranked points, the points are likely to form a few clusters of
nodes that have closely matched routes with the aligned motion
trajectory. If only a few clusters on a map are found, it is an
indication with strong certainty that the actual starting point is
in one of the clusters.
However, the motion trajectory is a noisy estimate of an
actual traveled route. Because the map matching algorithm is
topologically sensitive, some trajectories may not be accurately
scaled. In order to account for this fact, we stretch the motion
trajectory and repeat the prediction algorithm. With varied
trajectory scales, the probability of finding a valid match
between motion trajectory and the actual traveled route greatly
increases. The following section provides evaluation data.
https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/pub/han_ACComplice_comsnets12.pdf
Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Thanh-Le Nguyen, Adrian Perrig, and Joy Zhang 
"ACComplice: Location Inference using Accelerometers on Smartphones" In Proceedings 
of the 4th International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks 
(COMSNETS 2012), Bangalore, India, January 3-7, 2012.
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Fortunately adversaries are not all powerful.




You don’t have to run faster than the bear….
36http://forums.corvetteforum.com/off-topic/2824193-i-only-have-to-outrun-you-polar-bear-tag.html
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There are solutions to many cyber security problems...
... but we don’t use them.
30% of the computers on the Internet run Windows XP
• Windows 7 has vulnerabilities, but it’s better.
Apple users don’t use anti-virus.
• Yes, Apple tries to fix bugs, but 
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Many people liken cyber security to the flu.
DHS calls for “cyber hygiene”
• install anti-virus
• update your OS
• back up key files
—“STOP, THINK, CONNECT”
38
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Another model might be obesity....
Making people fat is good business:
• Farm subsidies
• Restaurants
• Healthcare and medical utilization
• Weight loss plans
—Few make money when Americans stay 
trim and healthy.
Lax security is also good business:
• Cheaper cost of deploying software
• Private information for marketing
• Selling anti-virus & security products
• Cleaning up incidents
—Few benefit from secure computers
39
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Some people say that cyber war is like nuclear war.
40
http://www.beyondnuclear.org/security/http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/mind-cyber-gap-deterrence-cyberspace
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Inherent with [today’s] technology
Impacts society as a whole
“Negative externality”
Good news: we can reduce 






Cyber Insecurity: The 21st Century’s Version of Air
Pollution
By Irving Lachow May 10, 2013 1 Comment
GETTY IMAGES
–  Then-­defense  secretary  Leon  Panetta  referred  to  the  threat  of  cyber  attacks  as  a
“cyber  Pearl  Harbor.”
–  A  senior  Cyber  Command  official  has  declared  that  we  are  in  the  middle  of
a  “cyber  arms  race.”
–  Other  experts  have  used  public  health  as  a  metaphor  for  the  cyber
security  challenge  facing  our  nation.
While all of these metaphors capture part of the challenge that we face, none of them helps policy-makers make
concrete decisions about the proper role of government in addressing the cyber-security threats facing our nation.
It may be more helpful to think about cyber security, or more properly, cyber insecurity, as a by-product of
Information Age activities like eCommerce, Web browsing, emailing, and using social media.  In other words, our
use of, and reliance upon, information technologies produces a state of insecurity—an exposure to liability, risk or
loss—that impacts society as a whole.
Viewed through this lens, cyber insecurity becomes a well-understood economic phenomenon—a negative
externality—that we have dealt with before. As Evan  Wolff has observed, a useful analogy for the situation we face
today is the challenge of air pollution in 1950s and 60s.
In the decades after World War II, the U.S. economy expanded rapidly.  While this growth drove innovation,
created jobs, and produced wealth, it also led to a pollution problem.
It was simply not in a company’s best interest to spend the resources needed to abate the pollution that resulted
from its processes or products.  While this calculation made sense for each specific enterprise, the country as a
whole suffered.
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Non-technical factors impact cyber security.
These factors reflect deep divisions within our society.
• Shortened development cycles
• Education: General failure in teaching science, engineering & math
• HR: Inability to attract and retain the best workers
• Immigration Policy: Foreign students; H1B Visa
• Manufacturing Policy: Building in your enemy’s factories is a bad idea
Solving the cyber security mess requires solving these issues
43
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Short development cycles
Insufficient planning:
• Security not “baked in” to most products.
• Few or no security reviews
• Little Usable Security
Insufficient testing:
• Testing does not uncover security flaws
• No time to retest after fixing
Poor deployment:
• Little monitoring for security problems
• Difficult to fix current system when new 
system is under development
44
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Education is not supplying enough security engineers
Security HR Pipeline
• High School → College → Graduate School → Career
Mastery Issue:
• Many professional programmers learn their craft in college.
• College English graduates: 16 years’ instruction in writing
• College CS graduates: 4 years’ instruction in programming
—Is it any wonder their code has security vulnerabilities?
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Snapchats Don't Disappear:
Forensics Firm Has Pulled
Dozens of Supposedly-Deleted
Photos From Android Phones
Another  way  to  undermine
Snapchat's  privacy  promises
A 24-year-old forensics examiner from Utah has
made a discovery that may make some Snapchat
users think twice before sending a photo that they
think is going to quickly disappear. Richard
Hickman of Decipher Forensics found that it’s
possible to pull Snapchat photos from Android
phones simply by downloading data from the
phone using forensics software and removing a
“.NoMedia” file extension that was keeping the
photos from being viewed on the device. He
published his findings online and local TV station
KSL has a video showing how it’s done.
“I was surprised no one else had done it because
of how easy it was,” said Hickman by phone. “It
just took a couple of days to discover it.”
Hickman started the research while in a Mobile
Forensics Class this spring. He says it’s come in
useful at Decipher Forensics as clients have wanted
Snapchat evidence from phones in divorce and
missing teenager cases. He says they have grabbed
60 to 70 deleted Snapchats from phones so far, with
at least 40 photos taken from just one phone.
Hickman says he’s now doing research on Snapchat
recovery from the iPhone; a few months ago,
Buzzfeed found at least one flaw that made that
possible. At the time, Snapchat founder Evan
Spiegel told Buzzfeed, “The people who most enjoy
using Snapchat are those who embrace the spirit and
intent of the service. There will always be ways to
reverse engineer technology products — but that
spoils the fun!”
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a senior online editor at Forbes. I was previously an
editor at Above the Law, a legal blog, relying on the
legal knowledge gained from two years working for
corporate law firm Covington & Burling -- a Cliff's
Notes version of law school. In the past, I've been
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73% of states require computer “skills” for graduation.
Only 37% require CS “concepts”
And teachers are poorly paid!
—Salaries for beginning & average teachers lag CS engineers by 30%
—Adjusting for cost-of-living and shorter work week.
• Linda Darling-Hammond, Stanford University, 2004
http://www.srnleads.org/data/pdfs/ldh_achievemen_gap_summit/inequality_TCR.pdf
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Computer Science undergraduate enrollment is low.
2010-2011 CRA Taulbee Survey:
48
Bachelor's Degree Production and Enrollments
The number of new computing majors among U.S. computer science departments rose 6.7 
percent (7.4 percent among those departments reporting both this year and last year). This is the 
fourth straight year of increased enrollment in computing majors by new students. Total enrollment 
in computing majors among U.S. CS departments increased 5.9 percent in aggregate (9.6 percent 
among departments reporting both this year and last year). Anecdotal reports suggest that, once 
again, growth in enrollment is being constrained at institutions not by student interest, but by 
enrollment caps in place in university computer science departments. Free of these caps – in place 
because of faculty or infrastructure limitations – enrollment figures might have reflected even larger 
increases. 
For the second straight year, there was a 
double-digit percentage increase in 
bachelor’s degree production. Among all 
departments reporting, the increase was 
10.4 percent, but if only those departments 
who reported both years are counted, the 
increase was 12.9 percent. Bachelor’s 
degree production in US computer science 
departments was up 10.5 percent overall 
and also was up 12.9 percent among those 
departments who reported both this year 
and last year. 
The number of CE degrees also increased 
significantly this year, among U.S. CE 
departments and among U.S. CS departments who also give CE degrees. Degrees in the 
information area also increased significantly among U.S. departments offering information degrees, 
but this may be affected by the categorization of several institutions whose CS and I departments 
report jointly. New student enrollment increased in aggregate among departments offering I 
programs but decreased among those 
offering CE programs (though it increased 
among CE departments that reported both 
years). Total enrollment in both CE and I 
programs increased in aggregate, though 
total enrollment decreased in I departments 
that reported both years. These data 
suggest increased interest in 
undergraduate computing degrees of all 
types within the U.S. It should be noted 
that the numbers for CE and I are more 
volatile due to the small number of 
departments reporting in each of these 
areas.
Canadian statistics also are volatile due to the small number of departments reporting. In 
aggregate, they show slightly decreased degree production, but Canadian response to the survey 
was unusually low this year and among Canadian departments reporting both years, there was an 
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7% of Bachelor’s degrees awarded to “nonresident alien”
(12,800 to US citizens)
—Most do not go on to advanced degrees.
49
Computing Research Association     1828 L St. NW, Suite 800,  Washington, DC.  20036    http://cra.org 
Table&5.&Bachelor’s&Degrees&Awarded&by&Ethnicity
CS CE I Total
Nonresident&Alien 524 7.0% 179 10.0% 78 3.6% 781 6.8%
Amer&Indian&or&Alaska&
NaBve
39 0.5% 8 0.4% 16 0.7% 63 0.5%
Asian 1,115 14.8% 337 18.8% 302 13.9% 1,754 15.3%
Black&or&AfricanKAmerican 274 3.6% 106 5.9% 151 6.9% 531 4.6%
NaBve&Hawaiian/Pac&
Islander
22 0.3% 7 0.4% 8 0.4% 37 0.3%
White 5026 66.9% 981 54.7% 1432 65.8% 7,439 64.8%
MulBracial,&not&Hispanic 104 1.4% 28 1.6% 3 0.1% 135 1.2%
Hispanic,&any&race 409 5.4% 146 8.1% 187 8.6% 742 6.5%
Total&Residency& &&Ethnicity&
Known 7,513 1,792 2,177 11,482
Resident,&ethnicity&unknown 741 200 99 1,040
Residency&unknown 1032 112 140 1,284
Grand&Total 9,286 2,104 2,416 13,806
Table&6.&Total&Bachelor’s&Enrollment&by&Department&Type



























US"CS"Public 29,163 5747 98 297.6 5398 987 33 163.6 3875 299 22 176.1 38,436 388.2
US"CS"Private 7852 248 34 230.9 725 9 9 80.6 248 0 5 49.6 8,825 259.6
US"CS"Total 37,015 5995 132 280.4 6123 996 42 145.8 5814 299 27 215.3 48,952 368.1
US"CE 0 0 0 0.0 1603 235 9 178.1 0 0 0 0.0 1,603 160.3
US"
InformaLon
0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0 3063 838 8 382.9 3,063 340.3
Canadian 6744 340 13 518.8 274 0 3 91.3 0 0 0 0.0 7,018 539.8
Grand"Total 43,759 6,335 145 301.8 8,000 1,231 54 148.1 8,877 1,137 35 253.6 60,636 367.5
Table&4.&Bachelor’s&Degrees&Awarded&by&Gender
CS CE I Total
Male 7,983 88.3% 1,856 88.2% 1,993 82.5% 11,832 87.3%
Female 1,057 11.7% 248 11.8% 422 17.5% 1,727 12.7%
Total"Known"Gender 9,040 2,104 2,415 13,559
Gender"Unknown 246 0 1 247
Grand"Total 9,286 2,104 2,416 13,806
Thursday, May 16, 13
—We should let them stay in the country after they graduate
Table&9.&Master’s&Degrees&Awarded&by&Ethnicity
CS CE I Total
Nonresident&Alien 3,332 56.7% 776 72.6% 389 19.6% 4,497 50.4%
Amer&Indian&or&Alaska&
NaBve 12 0.2% 0 0.0% 12 0.6% 24 0.3%
Asian 753 12.8% 108 10.1% 245 12.3% 1,106 12.4%
Black&or&AfricanKAmerican 96 1.6% 13 1.2% 123 6.2% 232 2.6%
NaBve&Hawaiian/Pac&
Island 19 0.3% 0 0.0% 6 0.3% 25 0.3%
White 1533 26.1% 142 13.3% 1113 56.1% 2,788 31.2%
MulBracial,&not&Hispanic 8 0.1% 4 0.4% 4 0.2% 16 0.2%
Hispanic,&any&race 119 2.0% 26 2.4% 92 4.6% 237 2.7%
Total&Residency& &
Ethnicity&Known 5,872 1,069 1,984 8,925
Resident,&ethnicity&
unknown 320 88 205 613
Residency&unknown 419 26 17 462


















US"CS"Public 8,048 98 82.1 895 22 40.7 1088 11 98.9 10,031 98 102.4
US"CS"Private 4,726 34 139.0 185 6 30.8 1495 4 373.8 6,406 34 188.4
Total"US"CS 12,774 132 96.8 1080 28 38.6 2583 15 172.2 16,437 132 124.5
US"CE 0 0 950 9 105.6 0 0 950 9 105.6
US"Info 0 0 0 0 2916 12 243.0 2,916 12 243.0
Canadian 1,114 12 92.8 98 2 49.0 0 0 1,212 12 101.0
Grand"Total 13,888 144 96.4 2,128 39 54.6 5,499 27 203.7 21,515 165 130.4
Computing Research Association     1828 L St. NW, Suite 800,  Washington, DC.  20036    http://cra.org 
50% of Master’s degrees awarded to nonresident alien
(4960 to US citizens)
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50% of PhDs awarded in 2011 to nonresident aliens
(642 to US citizens)
—We did not train Russia’s weapons scientists at MIT during the Cold War.
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Computing Research Association     1828 L St. NW, Suite 800,  Washington, DC.  20036    http://cra.org 
Table&13.&PhDs&Awarded&by&Ethnicity
CS CE I Total
Nonresident"Alien 634 48.1% 130 67.4% 44 37.0% 808 49.6%
Amer"Indian"or"Alaska"NaLve 2 0.2% 0 0.0% 2 1.7% 4 0.2%
Asian 171 13.0% 16 8.3% 14 11.8% 201 12.3%
Black"or"AfricanSAmerican 16 1.2% 1 0.5% 6 5.0% 23 1.4%
NaLve"Hawaiian/Pac"
Islander 4 0.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.2%
White 465 35.3% 42 21.8% 52 43.7% 559 34.3%
MulLracial,"not"Hispanic 3 0.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
Hispanic,"any"race 22 1.7% 4 2.1% 1 0.8% 27 1.7%
Total"Residency"&""Ethnicity"
Known 1,317 193 119 1,629
Resident,"ethnicity"unknown 43 4 2 49
Residency"unknown 96 8 0 104
Grand"Total 1,456 205 121 1,782
Thursday, May 16, 13
Just 67 / 1275 (5%) PhDs went into Information Assurance
15 professors & postdocs; 48 to industry & government
Security should be taught to everyone, but we need specialists
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North American PhD Granting Depts. 
Tenure-track 14 1 5 6 2 10 1 2 5 9 2 6 2 3 3 1 4 7 6 13 102 7.1% 
Researcher 6 1 4 6 1 1 0 6 2 0 2 7 2 2 2 3 1 3 7 17 73 5.1% 
Postdoc 38 1 12 17 4 12 0 20 7 5 2 12 7 7 14 6 3 10 30 34 241 16.8% 
Teaching Faculty 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 4 4 4 28 2.0% 
North American, 
Other Academic                       
Other CS/CE/I 
Dept. 3" 0" 4" 1" 1" 1" 4" 2" 2" 0" 5" 6" 1" 0" 0" 0" 0" 3" 1" 18" 52" 3.6%"




                      
Industry 64" 2" 49" 46" 41" 24" 20" 17" 40" 5" 6" 67" 29" 22" 25" 6" 12" 86" 32" 83" 676" 47.2%"
Government 7" 0" 5" 2" 6" 2" 5" 3" 8" 1" 2" 1" 0" 0" 2" 4" 1" 4" 2" 5" 60" 4.2%"
Self-Employed 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 1" 0" 1" 0" 0" 2" 2" 2" 0" 1" 0" 0" 1" 1" 1" 13" 0.9%"
Unemployed 2" 0" 2" 1" 2" 2" 1" 0" 2" 0" 1" 3" 0" 0" 1" 0" 2" 0" 1" 3" 23" 1.6%"
Other 2" 0" 1" 0" 0" 0" 1" 1" 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 0" 0" 0" 0" 0" 1" 0" 7" 0.5%"
Total Inside North 
America                       
 138" 6" 83" 80" 57" 54" 32" 53" 67" 22" 23" 106" 44" 35" 48" 20" 26" 118" 85" 178" 1,275" 89.0%"
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“...the problem may not be that 
there are too few STEM 
qualified college graduates, but 
rather that STEM firms are 
unable to attract them.
Highly qualified students may 
be choosing a non-STEM job 
because it pays better, offers a 
more stable professional 
career, and/or perceived as 
less exposed to competition 
from low-wage economies.”
Georgetown Prof: 50% of graduate students in sciences 
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Highest paying occupations:
• Oral Surgeons > $166,400
• Orthodontists > $166,400




• Architectural & Eng. Mgrs $119,260
• Prosthodontists $118,400
• Podiatrists $118,030
• Natural Sci. Mgrs. $116,020
• Computer Scientists: $115,070
• Petroleum Engineers $114,080
• Marketing Managers $112,800
• Lawyers: $112,760
Bureau of Labor Statistics puts CS as 12th highest paying 
profession, after...
54
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Manufacturing policy
• US did not buy WW2 aircraft in Germany
55
Thursday, May 16, 13
Security problems are bad for society as a whole...




Commercial Software radio Software radio Primary
programmer eavesdropper programmer risk
Determine whether patient has an ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine what kind of ICD patient has 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine ID (serial #) of ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Obtain private telemetry data from ICD 4 4 4 Privacy
Obtain private information about patient history 4 4 4 Privacy
Determine identity (name, etc.) of patient 4 4 4 Privacy
Change device settings 4 4 Integrity
Change or disable therapies 4 4 Integrity
Deliver command shock 4 4 Integrity
TABLE I
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTAL ATTACKS. A CHECK MARK INDICATES A SUCCESSFUL IN VITRO ATTACK.
goal of understanding and addressing the potential security
risks of ICDs before future ICDs and other IMDs become
more complex and the potential security and privacy risks to
patients increase. However, we also firmly believe in disclosing
this information in an ethical manner that fully considers the
well-being of patients. We specifically and purposefully omit
details that would allow someone to use this article as a guide
for creating attacks against ICDs.
Paper organization. Section II gives a brief introduction
to ICDs, describes the security model we consider in this
work, and summarizes related work. Section III discusses
the process of intercepting and reverse-engineering an ICD’s
wireless communications, beginning with RF signal analysis
and culminating in readable plaintext. Section IV discusses
replay attacks that compromise device integrity by changing
stored information or therapy settings. Section V extends the
discussion of zero-power defenses into the realm of device
design. Finally, Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND, MODEL, AND RELATED WORK
This section summarizes the characteristics and medical
usage of a modern implantable cardioverter defibrillator. It also
introduces some of the equipment we used in our analyses.
Following this introduction, we construct a security model that
classifies potential adversaries in terms of their capabilities.
Finally, we summarize previous research that motivates and
informs the methods and results of this work.
A. Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs)
An implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) is a device
that monitors and responds to heart activity. ICDs have modes
for pacing, wherein the device periodically sends a small
electrical stimulus to the heart, and for defibrillation, wherein
the device sends a larger shock to restore normal heart rhythm.
A physician surgically implants the ICD below the patient’s
clavicle and close to the skin (Fig. 1). The physician also
implants electrical leads that connect the ICD to the heart
muscle. Post-surgery, a health care practitioner can use an
external programmer to perform diagnostics, read and write
private data, and adjust therapy settings. A malfunctioning or
maliciously configured ICD could harm a patient in multiple
Fig. 1. Chest xray image of an implanted ICD (top right, near shoulder,
solid outline) and electrical leads connected to heart chambers (center of rib
cage, dotted outline).
ways, including by inaction (failure to deliver treatment when
necessary) or by extraneous action such as a command shock
when the heart is beating normally.
Magnetic switch. Inside the ICD is a magnetic switch.
A magnetic field in proximity to this switch causes it to
close, which in turn causes the ICD to wirelessly transmit
telemetry data, including electrocardiogram (EKG) readings.
(We discovered, however, that we can activate transmission of
telemetry on our ICD solely with an RF command and without
the presence of a magnet; see Section IV.) In a clinical setting,
the magnetic field comes from a magnet in the programming
head, which is the component of the programmer that is placed
in proximity to a patient’s implanted ICD. At the surface of
one programming head we measured this magnet at 700 gauss.
Wireless communications. Our ICD wirelessly communicates
with the external programmer using the 175 kHz band, which
is intended for short-range communications. Newer ICDs
can communicate at both the 175 kHz frequency and in
This paper, copyright the IEEE, will appear in the proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 3
2008: demonstrated wireless
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http://www.autosec.org/
—Comprehensive Experimental Analysis of 
Automotive Attack Surfaces (2011)
—Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern 
Automobile (2010)
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[ISN] TV-based botnets? DoS attacks on your fridge? 
More plausible than you think
!From: !InfoSec News <alerts@infosecnews.org>
!Subject: ! [ISN] TV-based botnets? DoS attacks on your fridge? More plausible than you 
think







It's still premature to say you need firewall or antivirus protection for your television set, but a 
duo of recently diagnosed firmware vulnerabilities in widely used TV models made by two 
leading manufacturers suggests the notion isn't as far-fetched as many may think.
... While poking around a Samsung D6000 model belonging to his brother, he inadvertently 
discovered a way to remotely send the TV into an endless restart mode that persists even 
after unplugging the device and turning it back on.
"It wasn't even planned," Auriemma told Ars, referring to the most damaging of his two 
attacks, which rendered the device useless for three days...
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[ISN] ATM Attacks Exploit Lax Security
!From: !InfoSec News <alerts@infosecnews.org>
!Subject: ! [ISN] ATM Attacks Exploit Lax Security
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Cell phones cannot be secured.
Cell phones have:
• Wireless networks, microphone, camera, & batteries
• Downloaded apps
• Bad crypto
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Five DARPA & NSF cyber security PMs walk into a bar...
Major security breakthroughs since 1980:
• Public key cryptography (RSA with certificates to distribute public keys)
• Fast symmetric cryptography (AES)
• Fast public key cryptography (elliptic curves)
• Easy-to-use cryptography (SSL/TLS)




But none of these breakthroughs has been a “silver bullet”
—“Why Cryptosystems Fail,” Ross Anderson, 
1st Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 1993. 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/wcf.pdf
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There is no obvious way to secure cyberspace.
We trust computers…
—but we cannot make them trustworthy. 
(A “trusted” system is a computer that can violate your security policy.)
We know a lot about building secure computers... 
—but we do not use this information when building and deploying them.
We know about usable security…
—but we can’t make any progress on usernames and passwords
We should design with the assumption that computers will fail…
—but it is cheaper to design without redundancy or resiliency.
Despite the newfound attention to cyber security, our systems seem 
to be growing more vulnerable every year.
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Be a [polite] critic of USG Information Systems
Our computers are terrible, but we can make them better.
Things you can do:
• Participate in contracting efforts and reviews.
• Read user agreements.
• Report bugs
Use Section 508!
• Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act  (29 USC 794 d) requires that federal 
government information systems accommodate people with disabilities.
• Bad typography, poor choice of fonts, use of Flash may be illegal!
• Speak with the Section 508 Coordinator — or volunteer to become one!
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Be a helpful
We don’t teach people to use Windows / Word / Excel productively.
Real live case:
• A Microsoft Word document was passed to multiple people for edits.
• I showed the admin how to “compare” and “merge” documents.
• I was a hero!
Take the time to learn:
• Microsoft Word Styles; Acrobat Forms; Excel Macros
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Push an INFOSEC AGENDA that is realistic.
Help your agencies deploy:
• IPv6
• DNSSEC
• Modern Web Browsers
Help your agencies eliminate:
• Windows XP
• Internet Explorer 6 / 7 / 8
Ask about backups!
• “Delete” an important file “by accident.”
• Can your IT group get it back? IF NOT, REPORT IT!
Submit bug reports!
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Don’t use pie charts
These two pie charts present exactly the same information.
This graph presents the same information better:
—And it’s Section 508 compliant!
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the whole of 100%. Seeing a bar extend to 25% along a quantitative scale conveys a part-to-
whole relationship only slightly less effectively than a pie chart with a quarter slice, especially 
if the bar graph’s title declares that it displays the parts of some total (for example, “Regional 
Breakdown of Total Revenue”). Despite the obvious nature of a pie charts message, bar 
graphs provide a m ch better means to compare the magnitudes of each part. Pie charts 
only make it easy to judge the magnitude of a slice when it is close to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
or 100%. Any percentages other than these are diffi cult to discern in a pie chart, but can be 
accurately discerned in a bar graph, thanks to the quantitative scale.
Allow me to illustrate. Here is a pie chart with six slices. Notice how easy it is to determine 







Now notice how that even the green slice, which was easy to read as 25% above, is no 







None of the values have changed. I simply sorted the slices by size. In the earlier example, 
our ability to decode the green slice at 25% was assisted by the fact that the green slice 
began at the 6 o’clock position and extended neatly to the 9 o’clock position. Positions at the 
extreme top, right, bottom, and left of a circle mark 90 degree intervals from one another, 
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company labels so w  wouldn’t have to rely o  a legend. We turned the pie chart into an 
awkwardly rranged equivalent of a table of labels and values. Here’s the same information, 









This information is much easier to read when presented in a table than it was when awk-
wardly arranged around the periphery of the pie. So why use a graph at all? Why show a 
picture of the data if the picture can’t be decoded and doesn’t present the information more 
meaningfully? The answer is: You shouldn’t. Graphs are useful when a picture of the data 
makes meaningful relationships visible (patterns, trends, and exceptions) that could not be 
easily discerned from a table of the same data.
But w at if w  could displ y this s me information in a graph that is easy to read; one that 
adds useful meaning by allowing us to compare he magnitud s of the values without label-
ing them? Here’s the same data display d i  bar chart:







Company Percentages of Total Market Share
Now the values can be compared with relative ease and precision, relying solely on the 
graph, without labeling the values. What value does this bar graph offer, compared to a 
table? In little more than a glance it paints a picture of the relationships between six com-
panies regarding market share. Not only is their relative rank apparent, but the differences 
in value from one company to the next is readily available to our eyes. Could we construct 
this same picture in our heads from a table of the same values? Perhaps, but it would take 
a great deal of effort and time. Why bother when a graph can do the work for you and tell 
the story in a way that speaks directly to the high-bandwidth, parallel imaging processor in 
Copyright © 2007 Stephen Few, Perceptual Edge Page 1 of 14
Save the Pies for Dessert
Stephen Few, Perceptual Edge




Not long ago I received an email from a colleague who keeps watch on business intelligence 
vendors and rates their products. She was puzzled that a particular product that I happen to 
like did not support pie charts, a feature that she assumed was basic and indispensable. Be-
cause of previous discussions between us, when I pointed out ineffective graphing practices 
that are popular in many BI products, she wondered if there might also be a problem with 
pie charts. Could this vendor’s omission of pie charts be intentional and justifi ed? I explained 
that this was indeed the case, and praised the vendor’s design team for their good sense.
Here sits the friendly pie chart:
Its slices are upturned into an inviting smile. Its simple charm is beloved by all but a few, 
welcomed almost everywhere; familiar and rarely threatening. Of all the graphs that play 
major roles in the lexicon of quantitative communication, however, the pie chart is by far the 
least effective. Its colorful voice is often heard, but rarely understood. It mumbles when it 
talks.
Nothing in the graph design course that I teach is more controversial than what I say about 
pie charts. People love them dearly and are often shocked to hear me speak ill of them. 
When students in my course don’t raise objections immediately, despite the shock on their 
faces, they often approach me during a break to defend their frequent use of pies. Many, 
I suspect, respond this way because they can’t imagine how they could possibly convince 
people where they work to abandon their beloved pies.
Pie charts are not without their strengths. The primary strength of a pie chart is the fact that 
the message “part-to-whole relationship” is built right into it in an obvious way. Children 
learn fractions by looking at pies sliced in various ways and decoding the ratio (quarter, half, 
three quarters, etc.) of each slice. A bar graph doesn’t have this obvious purpose built into 
its design. Not as directly, anyway, but it can be built into bar graphs in a way that prompts 
people to think in terms of a whole and its parts. This can be accomplished in part by using a 
percentage scale. It is easy and natural to think in terms of various percentages in relation to 
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Other things for SFS students to know...
Continuing education is really important!
• Go to conferences
• Read journals and magazines
• Keep reading the academic literature
• Concentrate on self-development.
Find a mentor.
Stay in touch with your faculty advisor!
Algorithms matter.
Data matters
• Learn how to present data
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Security problems reflect deep societal problems.
We need to fix our society.
Follow the money.
IEEE Security & Privacy
Florêncio and Herley, Dec. 2012
• Emptying accounts is hard
• Mules, not victims, lose money
• Passwords are not the bottleneck 
• Underground markets are not thriving




— https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot12/keynote-tba  (1 hour, 25 minutes)
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PASSWORDS
Passwords are but one link in the cybercrime value chain. Contrary to popular belief, compromised users 
are made whole and thieves have a hard time monetizing stolen credentials.
It’s not what you don’t know that kills you, it’s what 
you know for sure that ain’t true. —Mark Twain
I t is worth, at the outset, dispelling a widely held mis-apprehension about password stealing. "ieves cer-
tainly steal passwords, and money is certainly a large 
part of their motivation. However, when they success-
fully extract money from #nancial accounts, individual 
consumers do not pay. In the US, Federal Reserve Regu-
lation E limits consumer liability to US$50 in the event 
of fraud (this is separate from Regulation CC’s $50 limit 
for credit card fraud) and covers “any electronic trans-
fer that is initiated through an electronic terminal, tele-
phone, computer or magnetic tape.”1 "is regulation 
governs banks, brokerages, and credit unions, and many 
organizations go beyond it and o$er consumers a zero-
liability policy.
Bank of America, for example, “guarantees zero 
liability for any unauthorized activity originating from 
Online Banking or Bill Pay.”2 Wells Fargo says, “We 
guarantee that you will be covered for 100 percent of 
funds removed from your Wells Fargo accounts in the 
unlikely event that someone you haven’t authorized 
removes those funds through our Online Services.”3 
Fidelity “will reimburse your Fidelity account for 
any losses due to unauthorized activity,”4 and “under 
HSBC’s $0 Liability, Online Guarantee, you’re covered 
100% and liable for $0.”5 Even nontraditional #nancial 
institutions o$er this guarantee. For example, in eBay’s 
December 2009 10-K #ling, the company states, “Pay-
Pal currently voluntarily reimburses consumers for all 
#nancial losses from transactions not authorized by the 
consumer, not just losses above $50.”6
"us, in the US, individual consumers are largely 
insulated from the direct #nancial consequences of cre-
dential the% (we later brie&y mention losses of small 
businesses and indirect losses). (Although consumer 
protections in the US are good, they are by no means 
unique. EU Directive 2007/64/EC of the European 
Parliament limits consumer liability to €150, and many 
banks go beyond this. Mannan and van Oorschot found 
that most major Canadian banks o$er a “100% reim-
bursement guarantee for online banking fraud losses,” 
but they also suggest that most consumers are unlikely to 
meet the standard of care required to be eligible.7) Con-
sumers who have their accounts emptied through stolen 
credentials are made whole. Of course, the cost of the 
fraud does not just go away: covering fraud is a cost that 
gets passed back to consumers in the form of increased 
fees. However, the idea that consumers are “just a few 
clicks away” from having their accounts irretrievably 
emptied is simply incorrect. "ere is a world of di$er-
ence between being personally liable for losses and shar-
ing losses that are diluted across the whole population. 
Although “we all pay for cybercrime” is true in a general 
sense, individual users do not face grave #nancial risk.
We begin with this misconception because it is widely 
held and generates enormous confusion. Regulation 
Is Everything We Know about Password 
Stealing Wrong?
Dinei Florêncio and Cormac Herley | Microsoft Research
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We need to build a society that values computing.
K-12 Education that:
• Integrates data, communications & computation across the curricula
• Graduating programmers should have 10 years’ experience before writing 
code that can steal you credit card numbers!
Recovery Oriented Computing — backups that are:
• Trustworthy — (digital signatures)
• Multiple tiers — Online / Offline / Disconnected / Geographically Remote
• Durable — years / decades
• Organized — so information can be found
Policies that accomplish their stated goals. 
• 16 character passwords are no more secure than 12 character passwords
s
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Backup Slides
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